Proxy ssl handoff via mid-stream renegotiation

ABSTRACT

A traffic management device (TMD), system, and processor-readable storage medium directed towards re-establishing an encrypted connection of an encrypted session, the encrypted connection having initially been established between a client device and a first server device, causing the encrypted connection to terminate at a second server device. As described, a traffic management device (TMD) is interposed between the client device and the first server device. In some embodiments, the TMD may request that the client device renegotiate the encrypted connection. The TMD may redirect the response to the renegotiation request towards a second server device, such that the renegotiated encrypted connection is established between the client device and the second server device. In this way, a single existing end-to-end encrypted connection can be used to serve content from more than one server device

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

This Utility Patent Application is a Continuation of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 13/051,963 filed on Mar. 18, 2011, titled “ProxySSL Handoff Via Mid-Stream Renegotiation,” which is based on U.S.Provisional Patent Application No. 61/315,857, filed on Mar. 19, 2010,titled “Proxy SSL Handoff Via Mid-Stream Renegotiation,” the benefits ofwhich are claimed under 35 U.S.C. §120 and §119(e), and which are bothfurther incorporated by reference in their entireties.

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present invention relates generally to network communications, andmore particularly, but not exclusively, to managing renegotiationswithin a client/server end-to-end encrypted connection.

TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

An increasing number of applications within an enterprise are providedover Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Many of these applicationsprovide secure communications between a client device and a hostedwebsite. These applications include intranet portals, Webmail,front-office applications, back-office applications, and the like. Manyof these applications may also be accessed from a branch office eitherthrough a Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel, directly over the publicInternet, or the like. These applications may be available on a serverdevice inside a head office, for example. The head office and branchoffice include networks of computing devices secured behind securityperimeters, such as behind firewalls, or the like.

A traditional method of providing secure communications between theclient device and the server device employs a web browser and a websiteto establish an encrypted session. Encrypted sessions may be implementedusing a variety of secure communication protocols, including SecureSockets Layer (SSL) protocol, Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol,or the like. Managing such an encrypted session may be difficult attimes, especially where the server device may not have informationneeded by the client device, the server device fails, or the serverdevice otherwise needs to be replaced with a different server device.Therefore, it is with respect to these considerations and others thatthe present invention has been made.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Non-limiting and non-exhaustive embodiments are described with referenceto the following drawings. In the drawings, like reference numeralsrefer to like parts throughout the various figures unless otherwisespecified.

For a better understanding of the described embodiments, reference willbe made to the following Detailed Description, which is to be read inassociation with the accompanying drawings, wherein:

FIG. 1 illustrates a functional block diagram illustrating anenvironment for practicing various embodiments;

FIG. 2 illustrates one embodiment of a network device that may beincluded in a system implementing various embodiments;

FIG. 3 illustrates one embodiment of a server device that may beincluded in a system implementing various embodiments;

FIG. 4 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing oneembodiment of an overview of a process for replacing an endpoint in anend-to-end encrypted connection;

FIG. 5 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing oneembodiment of a process for generating a session key associated with anend-to-end encrypted session;

FIG. 6 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing oneembodiment of a process for replacing an endpoint in an end-to-endencrypted connection with a second server device;

FIG. 7 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing oneembodiment of a process for enhancing data transmitted between aclient-side TMD and a server-side TMD over the encrypted connection;

FIG. 8 illustrates one embodiment of a signal flow diagram generallyusable with the process of FIG. 4; and

FIG. 9 illustrates a functional block diagram illustrating anenvironment for utilizing a Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to routetraffic to a client-side traffic management device for encryptedsessions.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following detailed description of exemplary embodiments,reference is made to the accompanied drawings, which form a part hereof,and which show by way of illustration examples by which the describedembodiments may be practiced. Sufficient detail is provided to enablethose skilled in the art to practice the described embodiments, and itis to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized, and otherchanges may be made, without departing from the spirit or scope.Furthermore, references to “one embodiment” are not required to pertainto the same or singular embodiment, though they may. The followingdetailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting sense,and the scope of the described embodiments is defined only by theappended claims.

Throughout the specification and claims, the following terms take themeanings explicitly associated herein, unless the context clearlydictates otherwise. As used herein, the term “or” is an inclusive “or”operator, and is equivalent to the term “and/or,” unless the contextclearly dictates otherwise. The term “based on” is not exclusive andallows for being based on additional factors not described, unless thecontext clearly dictates otherwise. In addition, throughout thespecification, the meaning of “a,” “an,” and “the” include pluralreferences. The meaning of “in” includes “in” and “on.”

As used herein, application layer refers to layers 5 through 7 of theseven-layer protocol stack as defined by the ISO-OSI (InternationalStandards Organization-Open Systems Interconnection) framework.

The term “network connection” refers to a collection of links and/orsoftware elements that enable a computing device to communicate withanother computing device over a network. One such network connection maybe a TCP connection. TCP connections are virtual connections between twonetwork nodes, and are typically established through a TCP handshakeprotocol. The TCP protocol is described in more detail in Request forComments (RFC) 793, available from the Internet Engineering Task Force(IETF), and is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety. Anetwork connection “over” a particular path or link refers to a networkconnection that employs the specified path or link to establish and/ormaintain a communication. The term “node” refers to a network elementthat typically interconnects one or more devices, or even networks.

As used herein, including the claims, the term “SSL” refers to SSL, TLS,DTLS and all secure communications protocols derived therefrom. The SSLprotocol is described in Netscape Communications Corp, Secure SocketsLayer (SSL) version 3 (November 1996), and the TLS protocol is derivedfrom SSL, and is described in Dierks, T., and Allen, C., “The TLSProtocol Version 1.0,” RFC 2246 (January 1999), available from the IETF.The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol is based on theTLS protocol, and is described in Rescorla, E., and Modadugu, N.,“Datagram Transport Layer Security,” RFC 4347 (April 2006), availablefrom the IETF. Each of these documents are incorporated by reference intheir entirety. An SSL connection is a network connection that issecured by cryptographic information derived from an SSL protocol. TheSSL protocol operates between an application layer (such as one or moreof OSI layers 5-7) and a transport layer (such as OSI layer 4). The SSLprotocol may provide security for application layer protocols such asHyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Lightweight Directory AccessProtocol (LDAP), Internet Messaging Access Protocol (IMAP), or the like.For example, HTTP over SSL (HTTPS) utilizes the SSL protocol to secureHTTP data. The SSL protocol may utilize TCP/IP on behalf of theapplication layer protocols to transport secure data. The SSL protocolmay also employ a certificate. In one embodiment, the certificate is anX.509 certificate, such as those described in RFC 2459, available fromthe IETF.

As used herein, including the claims, the term “server device” refers toa physical server device or to a virtual server executing on a physicalserver device.

An SSL session established a secure connection over a network betweentwo endpoints. An SSL session may be associated with zero or more SSLconnections. The SSL protocol uses an SSL handshake protocol to initiatean SSL session and/or SSL connection. An SSL session is associated witha master key, the master key being one result of the SSL handshakeprotocol. The SSL handshake protocol also includes an SSL re-handshakeprotocol for renegotiating an SSL connection. The renegotiated SSLconnection may be associated with the current SSL session or withanother SSL session.

Briefly, SSL supports at least four content types: application_data,alert, handshake, and change_cipher_spec. Alert, handshake, andchange_cipher_spec content types are associated with messages formanaging the SSL protocol. For example, an SSL alert is of the alertcontent type and is used for signaling, among other things, errorconditions. SSL has provisions for other content types, but thesecapabilities are not commonly used.

The SSL handshake protocol includes the exchange and processing of aseries of messages, which may be one of an alert, handshake, and/orchange_cipher_spec content type. One or more SSL handshake messages isare encapsulated within one or more network records of the handshakecontent type. The SSL handshake message also includes an associated SSLhandshake type, and one or more data fields.

The SSL handshake protocol typically begins with the client devicesending to the server device, among other things, randomly generateddata within a CLIENT-HELLO message (e.g. an SSL handshake message withan associated SSL handshake type of “CLIENT-HELLO”). The server deviceresponds to the CLIENT-HELLO message with, among other things, randomlygenerated data within a SERVER-HELLO message. In addition, the servermay provide a server certificate which the client may use toauthenticate the server. In addition, the server may request or requirea client certificate which the server may use to authenticate theclient.

The client device, using the randomly generated data exchanged in theCLIENT-HELLO and SERVER-HELLO messages, generates a pre-master secretfor an SSL session. In one embodiment, the client device may alsoinclude another random number in the pre-master secret, one that hastypically not been transmitted over a public network in the clear. Theclient device then sends the pre-master secret to the server device inan SSL handshake message. In one embodiment, the pre-master secret maybe encrypted using a public key associated with the server (obtainedfrom the server's SERVER-HELLO message). Typically, the SSL handshakemessage that includes the pre-master secret is a CLIENT-KEY-EXCHANGEhandshake message. Each of the client device and the server device,separately, perform a series of steps to generate a master secret usingthe pre-master secret. This master secret is associated with the SSLsession. Then, separately, each of the client device and the serverdevice use the master secret to generate connection keys, which mayinclude, but are not limited to, cipher keys used to encrypt and decryptcommunicated data over the associated SSL connection and/orauthentication keys used verify messages received over the associatedSSL connection. The client device and the server device may then usetheir respective instances of the connection key(s) to generate and sendmessages containing encrypted payloads to each other.

As used herein, including the claims, the term “encrypted session”refers to zero or more encrypted connections between two endpointdevices. Example encrypted sessions include SSL, TLS, and DTLS session.As used herein, the term “encrypted connection” refers to any networkconnection secured by cryptographic information, such as SSL, TLS, andDTLS connections, although other encrypted connections are similarlycontemplated. An encrypted connection includes cipher keys used toencrypt and decrypt data communicated over the encrypted connection, aswell as a reference to an underlying transport protocol interface, suchas a TCP interface.

As used herein, the phrase “encrypted session/connection” refers toeither an encrypted session or an encrypted connection.

As used herein, the phrase “end-to-end encrypted session/connection”refers to a session/connection between two endpoint devices, where bothendpoint devices know the identity of the other endpoint device whenestablishing the encrypted session/connection.

As used herein, the phrase “terminating an encrypted session” refers tobeing one of the two endpoints of an encrypted session. Similarly, thephrase “terminating an encrypted connection” refers to being one of thetwo endpoints of an encrypted connection. The endpoints of an encryptedsession/connection are devices, commonly referred to as a client deviceand a server device, between which encrypted data may be transmitted.Examples of a client device and a server device are an SSL client and anSSL server. As used herein, the phrase “encrypted session/connectionclient” refers to a client device, and the phrase “encryptedsession/connection server” refers to a server device.

As used herein, the phrase “establishing an encrypted session” refers toparticipating in an encrypted session handshake protocol. The phrase“establishing an encrypted connection” refers to generating an encryptedconnection within an encrypted session based on the encrypted session'ssession key (also known as the encrypted session's master key). In oneembodiment, two devices establish the encrypted session/connection,becoming the endpoints of the encrypted session/connection. Additionaldevices also may optionally participate in establishing the encryptedsession/connection, either in conjunction with one or both of theendpoints, or without the knowledge of one or both endpoints. Oneexample of an encrypted session handshake protocol is an SSL handshakeprotocol.

As used herein, the phrase “out-of-band” refers to sending data outsideof a current encrypted session/connection, such as sending the data overa connection distinct from an end-to-end encrypted session/connectionestablished between a client device and a server device.

As used herein, the phrase “secret data” refers to data that enables anencrypted session handshake between two devices. Secret data includes,for example, a master secret and a pre-master secret as described in RFC2246, referenced above.

As used herein, the term “payload” refers to data included within apacket, and distinct from a packet header of the packet.

Throughout this disclosure, when specific message types are listed, suchas “CLIENT-HELLO”, it is understood that these are examples used toillustrate a type of message. These specific messages are but oneembodiment, and other similar messages used to establish and/or maintainan encrypted session/connection are similarly contemplated.

Briefly described is a mechanism for re-establishing an encryptedconnection, causing an encrypted connection that had terminated at aclient device and a first server device to be to terminate at the clientdevice and a second server device. As a skilled artisan will appreciate,encrypted sessions such as SSL sessions, and any encrypted connectionscontained within an encrypted session, are designed to secure theidentity of each endpoint for the duration of the session/connection.Thus, disclosed embodiments that enable an endpoint of an establishedencrypted connection to be replaced are here-to-now unexpected.

As described, a traffic management device (TMD) is interposed betweenthe client device and the first server device. During establishment ofan end-to-end encrypted session/connection between the client device andfirst server device, the interposed TMD accesses secret informationabout the encrypted session/connection. Such information includes, forexample a pre-master secret usable to determine connection keys forencrypting and decrypting data transmitted across encrypted connectionswithin the end-to-end encrypted session. By accessing the secretinformation for the end-to-end encrypted session/connection, the TMD isable to read, intercept, augment, delete, delay, prune, compress,enhance, accelerate, transpose, or otherwise modify data sent over theencrypted connection.

In some embodiments, the TMD may transmit, to the client device, arequest to renegotiate an end-to-end encrypted connection. Therenegotiation request may include, for example, an SSL HELLO REQUESTmessage. From the perspective of the client device, it appears as thoughthe first server device has asked the client device to renegotiate theexisting encrypted connection—the client device is typically unawarethat the TMD initiated the renegotiation. In response to therenegotiation request, the client device may transmit, over theencrypted connection, a CLIENT HELLO message addressed to the firstserver device. In one embodiment, the TMD may intercept the CLIENT HELLOmessage, decrypt it, and redirect it towards the second server device.Subsequent messages transmitted by the client device may be similarlyredirected towards the second server device. As a result, from theperspective of the client device, the original encrypted connection hasbeen re-established with the second server device. From the perspectiveof the first server device, it's encrypted connection with the clientdevice has ended. From the perspective of the TMD, an existing encryptedconnection between the client device and the first server device hasbeen replaced with a new encrypted connection between the client deviceand the second server device. In one embodiment, the client device isunaware that it shares an encrypted connection with a different server.Additionally or alternatively, if one or more client certificates orserver certificates are included in or with the encrypted sessionhandshake messages, these certificates may be used by the client andserver to authenticate the identity of each other, thus preserving thetrust relationship that would exist if the TMD had not been insertedbetween the client and server.

In one embodiment, the TMD discussed above is a server-side TMD, and theserver-side TMD may be used in conjunction with a client-side TMD toenhance or otherwise modify data transmitted between one or more clientdevices and one or more server devices. In one embodiment, theclient-side TMD may not be interposed directly between a client deviceand a server device, making some optimizations difficult. In thisembodiment, the client-side TMD may utilize a Border Gateway Protocol(BGP) to cause internet routers to route traffic addressed to the serverdevice through the client-side TMD. In this way, the client-side TMD isenabled to become inserted between the client and server devices andthereby enhance or otherwise modify data transferred between the clientand server devices.

In one embodiment, a TMD may proxy one or more encrypted connectionsbetween a client device and a plurality of server devices by switchingthe server-side endpoint of an encrypted connection between theplurality of server devices based on HTTP request type, time of day,access policy information, or other criteria. In one embodiment, the TMDmay be located in geographic proximity to the client device, while inanother embodiment the TMD may be located in geographic proximity to theserver device. Additionally or alternatively, a TMD may similarly proxyconnections between a server device and a plurality of client devicesbased on HTTP request type, time of day, access policy information, orother criteria.

Illustrative Operating Environment

FIG. 1 shows components of an illustrative environment 100 in which thedescribed embodiments may be practiced. Not all the components may berequired to practice the described embodiments, and variations in thearrangement and type of the components may be made without departingfrom the spirit or scope of the described embodiments. FIG. 1illustrates client devices 102-104, client-side traffic managementdevice (TMD) 106, branch office 107, network 108, server-side trafficmanagement device 110, end-to-end encrypted session (A), secure tunnel(B) through network 108, private keys 111(1) through 111(n), serverdevices 112 through 114, authentication server device 115, secret data116, third party content provider 118, and head office 120. Serverdevices 112-114 (server device 113 not shown) and authentication serverdevice 115 are collectively referred to herein as server devices112-115.

Generally, client devices 102-104 may include virtually any computingdevice capable of connecting to another computing device and receivinginformation. Client devices 102-104 may be located within the branchoffice 107, but client devices 102-104 may alternatively be locatedoutside of branch office 107. Such devices may include personalcomputers, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based or programmableconsumer electronics, network devices, and the like. Client devices102-104 may also include portable devices such as, cellular telephones,smart phones, display pagers, radio frequency (RF) devices, infrared(IR) devices, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), handheld computers,wearable computers, tablet computers, integrated devices combining oneor more of the preceding devices, and the like. As such, client devices102-104 may range widely in terms of capabilities and features.

Client devices 102-104 may further include one or more clientapplications that are configured to manage various actions. Moreover,client devices 102-104 may also include a web browser application thatis configured to enable an end-user to interact with other devices andapplications over network 108.

Network 108 is configured to couple network enabled devices, such asclient devices 102-104, TMDs 106 and 110, server devices 112-114,authentication server device 115, and third party content provider 118,with other network enabled devices. In one embodiment, client device 102may communicate with server device 112 through client-side TMD 106,network 108, and server-side TMD 110. Additionally or alternatively,client device 102, client-side TMD 106, server-side TMD 110, and serverdevice 112 may all be connected directly to network 108. In oneembodiment, network 108 may enable encrypted sessions, such asend-to-end encrypted session (A), between client devices 102-104 andserver devices 112-115.

Network 108 is enabled to employ any form of computer readable media forcommunicating information from one electronic device to another. In oneembodiment, network 108 may include the Internet, and may include localarea networks (LANs), wide area networks (WANs), direct connections,such as through a universal serial bus (USB) port, other forms ofcomputer-readable media, or any combination thereof. On aninterconnected set of LANs, including those based on differingarchitectures and protocols, a router may act as a link between LANs, toenable messages to be sent from one to another. Also, communicationlinks within LANs typically include fiber optics, twisted wire pair, orcoaxial cable, while communication links between networks may utilizeanalog telephone lines, full or fractional dedicated digital linesincluding T1, T2, T3, and T4, Integrated Services Digital Networks(ISDNs), Digital Subscriber Lines (DSLs), wireless links includingsatellite links, or other communications links known to those skilled inthe art.

Network 108 may further employ a plurality of wireless accesstechnologies including, but not limited to, 2nd (2G), 3rd (3G), 4th (4G)generation radio access for cellular systems, Wireless-LAN, WirelessRouter (WR) mesh, and the like. Access technologies such as 2G, 3G, 4G,and future access networks may enable wide area coverage for networkdevices, such as client devices 102-104, or the like, with variousdegrees of mobility. For example, network 108 may enable a radioconnection through a radio network access such as Global System forMobil communication (GSM), General Packet Radio Services (GPRS),Enhanced Data GSM Environment (EDGE), Wideband Code Division MultipleAccess (WCDMA), and the like.

Furthermore, remote computers and other related electronic devices couldbe remotely connected to either LANs or WANs via a modem and temporarytelephone link, a DSL modem, a cable modem, a fiber optic modem, an802.11 (Wi-Fi) receiver, and the like. In essence, network 108 includesany communication method by which information may travel between onenetwork device and another network device.

Secure tunnel (B) through network 108 includes any tunnel forcommunicating information between network devices. Typically, securetunnel (B) is encrypted. As used herein, a “tunnel” or “tunneledconnection” is a network mechanism that provides for the encapsulationof network packets or frames at a same or lower layer protocol of theOpen Systems Interconnection (OSI) network stack. Tunneling may beemployed to take packets or frames from one network system and place(e.g. encapsulate) them inside frames from another network system.Examples of tunneling protocols include, but are not limited to IPtunneling, Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP), Layer 2 Forwarding (L2F),VPNs, IP SECurity (IPSec), Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP),GRE, MBone, and SSL/TLS. As shown, secure tunnel (B) is created forsecure connections between client-side TMD 106 and server-side TMD 110through network 108.

One embodiment of a network device that could be used as client-side TMD106 or server-side TMD 110 is described in more detail below inconjunction with FIG. 2. Briefly, however, client-side TMD 106 andserver-side TMD 110 each include virtually any network device thatmanages network traffic. Such devices include, for example, routers,proxies, firewalls, load balancers, cache devices, applicationaccelerators, devices that perform network address translation, anycombination of the preceding devices, or the like. Such devices may beimplemented solely in hardware or in hardware and software. For example,such devices may include some application specific integrated circuits(ASICs) coupled to one or more microprocessors. The ASICs may be used toprovide a high-speed switch fabric while the microprocessors may performhigher layer processing of packets.

In one embodiment, server-side TMD 110 is typically located within headoffice 120, and as such is considered to be physically secure and underthe direct management of a central administrator. Accordingly,server-side TMD 110 may also be known as a trusted TMD. Server-side TMD110 may control, for example, the flow of data packets delivered to, orforwarded from, an array of server device devices, such as serverdevices 112-115. In one embodiment, messages sent between theserver-side TMD 110 and the server devices 112-115 may be part of asecure channel, such end-to-end encrypted session (A) formed between oneof client devices 102-104 and one of the server devices 112-115. Inanother embodiment, server-side TMD 110 may terminate an encryptedconnection on behalf of a server device, and employ another type ofencryption, such as IPSec, to deliver packets to or forward packets fromthe server device. Alternatively, when the server-side TMD 110terminates the encrypted connection on behalf of a server device,delivering packets to or forwarding packets from the server device maybe performed with no encryption (or “in the clear”).

In one embodiment, client-side TMD 106 typically resides in branchoffice 107, physically outside the control of central administrators,and therefore may be subject to physical tampering. Accordingly,client-side TMD 106 may be known as an untrusted TMD. In one embodiment,client-side TMD 106 may forward data from a source to a destination. Forexample, client-side TMD 106 may forward one or more encrypted sessionhandshake messages between one of client devices 102-104 and one ofserver devices 112-115. Alternatively, a client-side TMD may reside inthe head office 120. Alternatively, a client-side TMD may be includedwith a server-side TMD in a single device, enabling a single device toprovide the services of both a client-side TMD and a server-side TMD,based on the types and locations of devices transmitting data throughthe TMD. Alternatively or additionally, a TMD may act as both aclient-side TMD and a server-side TMD for a single connection. Forexample, a TMD may act as a client-side TMD by routing a request to aserver-side TMD in another office. However, the server-side TMD mayre-route the request to a server device located in geographic proximityto the “client-side” TMD. In this case, the “client-side” TMD willconnect the client device to the local server device. When connectingthe client device to a local server device, the TMD that began as a“client-side” TMD may perform the role of a “server-side” TMD.

As described in more detail below, client-side TMD 106 may receivesecret data 116, typically from server-side TMD 110, that enables it toperform various additional actions on encrypted connection messages sentbetween one of client devices 102-104 and one of server devices 112-115.For example, client-side TMD 106 may be enabled to read, intercept,augment, delete, prune, compress, delay, enhance, transpose, orotherwise modify data within an encrypted connection message.

In one embodiment, server device private keys 111 may be centralizedinside of the head office 120, a Federal Information Processing Standard(FIPS) boundary, or the like. Server-side TMD 110 may be enabled toaccess the private keys 111, or the like, through a variety ofmechanisms.

Server devices 112-115 may include any computing device capable ofcommunicating packets to another network device. Each packet may conveya piece of information. A packet may be sent for handshaking, e.g., toestablish a connection or to acknowledge receipt of data. The packet mayinclude information such as a request, a response, or the like.Generally, packets received by server devices 112-115 will be formattedaccording to TCP/IP, but they could also be formatted using anotherprotocol, such as SCTP, X.25, NetBEUI, IPX/SPX, token ring, similarIPv4/6 protocols, and the like. Moreover, the packets may becommunicated between server devices 112-115, server-side TMD 110, andone of client devices 102-104 employing HTTP, HTTPS, and the like.

In one embodiment, server devices 112-115 are configured to operate as awebsite server. However, server devices 112-115 are not limited to webserver devices, and may also operate a messaging server, a File TransferProtocol (FTP) server, a database server, content server, and the like.Additionally, each of server devices 112-115 may be configured toperform a different operation. Thus, for example, server device 112 maybe configured as a messaging server, while server device 114 isconfigured as a database server. Moreover, while server devices 112-115may operate as other than a website, they may still be enabled toreceive an HTTP communication.

Devices that may operate as server devices 112-115 include personalcomputers, desktop computers, multiprocessor systems,microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, network PCs,server devices, and the like.

As discussed above, secret data 116 typically includes a pre-mastersecret and/or a master secret. In one embodiment, a client device and aserver device may exchange nonces (number used once) in their respectiveHELLO messages, for use in generating the session key (also known as themaster key). Additionally or alternatively, secret data 116 may includeanother nonce (distinct from the nonce's contained in HELLO messages)generated by the client device and digitally encrypted by the clientdevice using the public key of the server device. In one embodiment,secret data 116 is utilized by one or more of the client device,server-side TMD 110, and the server device to generate a session key.

Third party content provider 118 may optionally be used to providecontent, for example advertisements, to be inserted by server-side TMD110 or client-side TMD 106 into an encrypted connection. However, thirdparty content is not so limited, and may additionally include contentprovided by an affiliated business partner, a corporate IT department,and the like.

It is further noted that terms such as client and server may refer tofunctions within a device. As such, virtually any device may beconfigured to operate as a client, a server, or even include both aclient and a server function. Furthermore, where two or more peers areemployed, any one of them may be designated as a client or as a server,and be configured to confirm to the teachings of the present invention.

Illustrative Network Device Environment

FIG. 2 shows one embodiment of a network device, according to oneembodiment of the invention. Network device 200 may include many more orless components than those shown. The components shown, however, aresufficient to disclose an illustrative embodiment for practicing theinvention. Network device 200 may represent, for example, server-sideTMD 110 and/or client-side TMD 106 of FIG. 1.

Network device 200 includes processing unit 212, video display adapter214, and a mass memory, all in communication with each other via bus222. The mass memory generally includes RAM 216, ROM 232, and one ormore permanent mass storage devices, such as hard disk drive 228, tapedrive, CD-ROM/DVD-ROM drive 226, and/or floppy disk drive. The massmemory stores operating system 220 for controlling the operation ofnetwork device 200. Network device 200 also includes encrypted sessionmanager 252, border gateway protocol (BGP) module 256, and otherapplication 258.

As illustrated in FIG. 2, network device 200 also can communicate withthe Internet, or some other communications network via network interfaceunit 210, which is constructed for use with various communicationprotocols including the TCP/IP protocol. Network interface unit 210 issometimes known as a transceiver, transceiving device, or networkinterface card (NIC).

The mass memory as described above illustrates another type ofcomputer-readable media, namely computer storage media. Computer storagemedia may include volatile, nonvolatile, removable, and non-removablemedia implemented in any method or technology for storage ofinformation, such as computer readable instructions, data structures,program modules, or other data. Examples of computer storage mediainclude RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology,CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical storage, magneticcassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magneticstorage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store thedesired information and which can be accessed by a computing device.

The mass memory also stores program code and data. One or moreapplications 258 are loaded into mass memory and run on operating system220. Examples of application programs may include email programs,routing programs, schedulers, calendars, database programs, wordprocessing programs, HTTP programs, traffic management programs,security programs, and so forth.

Network device 200 may further include applications that supportvirtually any secure connection, including TLS, TTLS, EAP, SSL, IPSec,and the like. Such applications may include, for example, encryptedsession manager 252, and BGP protocol module 256.

In one embodiment, encrypted session manager 252 may perform encryptedsession processing, including managing an encrypted session handshake,managing keys, certificates, authentication, authorization, or the like.Moreover, encrypted session manager 252 may in one embodiment establishencrypted sessions and/or connections, terminate encrypted sessionsand/or connections, establish itself as a man-in-the-middle of anencrypted session and/or connection, or the like. Moreover, encryptedsession manager 252 may in one embodiment initiate an encryptedconnection renegotiation for the purpose of replacing the serverendpoint of the encrypted session with another server endpoint.

Additionally, network device 200 may include applications that support avariety of tunneling mechanisms, such as VPN, PPP, L2TP, and so forth.

Network device 200 may also include input/output interface 224 forcommunicating with external devices, such as a mouse, keyboard, scanner,or other input devices not shown in FIG. 2. Likewise, network device 200may further include additional mass storage facilities such asCD-ROM/DVD-ROM drive 226 and hard disk drive 228. Hard disk drive 228may be utilized to store, among other things, application programs,databases, certificates, public and private keys, secret data, and thelike.

In one embodiment, the network device 200 includes at least oneApplication Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) chip (not shown) coupledto bus 222. The ASIC chip can include logic that performs some of theactions of network device 200. For example, in one embodiment, the ASICchip can perform a number of packet processing functions for incomingand/or outgoing packets. In one embodiment, the ASIC chip can perform atleast a portion of the logic to enable the operation of encryptedsession manager 252 and/or BGP module 256.

In one embodiment, network device 200 can further include one or morefield-programmable gate arrays (FPGA) (not shown), instead of, or inaddition to, the ASIC chip. A number of functions of the network devicecan be performed by the ASIC chip, the FPGA, by CPU 212 withinstructions stored in memory, or by any combination of the ASIC chip,FPGA, and CPU.

In one embodiment, some client devices, such as client device 102, maynot be connected to client-side TMD 106 through a LAN or other directconnection. For example, client device 102 may not be located in abranch office having a client-side TMD. Additionally or alternatively,client device 102 may be a mobile device. When a client device is notdirectly connected to a client-side TMD, the client device may establishan encrypted session or otherwise transmit data to one of servers112-115 without a client-side TMD to intercept and process the data.However, it is often beneficial for a client-side TMD to intercept andenhance such communication.

Towards this end, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) module 256 may, in oneembodiment, enable network traffic originating from one or more clientdevices to be routed through client-side TMD 106. In one embodiment, BGPmodule 256 ensures this routing by broadcasting a BGP protocol messageto routers on the internet, the message indicating that client-side TMD106 knows a best route for data addressed to server devices 112-115. Asa result, routers having received the BGP protocol message typicallywill route network traffic addressed to one of server devices 112-115through client-side TMD 106. As a result, client devices that are notdirectly connected to a client-side TMD may have their connections toserver devices 112-115, including encrypted sessions, routed through aclient-side TMD 106. In this way, client-side TMD 106 is enabled toperform various actions improving the efficiency of the network, forexample compressing, accelerating, or otherwise modifying data.

Illustrative Server Device Environment

FIG. 3 shows one embodiment of a server device, according to oneembodiment of the invention. Server device 300 may include many morecomponents than those shown. The components shown, however, aresufficient to disclose an illustrative embodiment for practicing theinvention. Server device 300 may represent, for example, Servers 112-114and Authentication Server 115 of FIG. 1.

Server device 300 includes processing unit 312, video display adapter314, and a mass memory, all in communication with each other via bus322. The mass memory generally includes RAM 316, ROM 332, and one ormore permanent mass storage devices, such as hard disk drive 328, tapedrive, CD-ROM/DVD-ROM drive 326, and/or floppy disk drive. The massmemory stores operating system 320 for controlling the operation ofserver device 300. Any general-purpose operating system may be employed.Basic input/output system (“BIOS”) 318 is also provided for controllingthe low-level operation of server device 300. As illustrated in FIG. 3,server device 300 also can communicate with the Internet, or some othercommunications network, via network interface unit 310, which isconstructed for use with various communication protocols including theTCP/IP protocol. Network interface unit 310 is sometimes known as atransceiver, transceiving device, or network interface card (NIC).

The mass memory as described above illustrates another type ofcomputer-readable media, namely computer storage media.Computer-readable storage media may include volatile, nonvolatile,removable, and non-removable media implemented in any method ortechnology for storage of information, such as computer readableinstructions, data structures, program modules, or other data. Examplesof computer readable storage media include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flashmemory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD)or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magneticdisk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other physicalmedium which can be used to store the desired information and which canbe accessed by a computing device.

One or more applications 350 may be loaded into mass memory and run onoperating system 320. Examples of application programs may includetranscoders, schedulers, calendars, database programs, word processingprograms, HTTP programs, customizable user interface programs, IPSecapplications, encryption programs, security programs, VPN programs, webservers, account management, and so forth. Applications 350 may includeencrypted session module 360. Encrypted session module 360 may establishencrypted sessions and/or connections with other network devices,including any of the network devices discussed above. In one embodiment,encrypted session module 360 may work cooperatively with TMD 110 or TMD106 of FIG. 1.

Additionally or alternatively, encrypted session module 360 maycommunicate with other network devices independent of any TMD.

Applications 350 may also include a variety of web services that areconfigured to provide content, including messages, over a network toanother computing device. These web services include for example, a webserver, messaging server, a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) server, adatabase server, a content server, or the like. These web services mayprovide the content including messages over the network using any of avariety of formats, including, but not limited to WAP, HDML, WML, SMGL,HTML, XML, cHTML, xHTML, or the like.

Generalized Operation

The operation of certain aspects will now be described with respect toFIGS. 4-8. FIGS. 4-7 provide logical flow diagrams illustrating certainaspects, while FIG. 8 provides a signal flow diagram. FIG. 4 illustratesa logical flow diagram generally showing one embodiment of a process forreplacing an endpoint in an end-to-end encrypted connection. In oneembodiment, process 400 may be implemented by server-side TMD 110.

Process 400 begins, after a start block, at block 402, by a server-sideTMD interposed between a client device and a first server device. In oneembodiment, the server-side TMD determines a session key associated withan end-to-end encrypted session between the client device and the firstserver device. The determination of the session key is described in moredetail below in conjunction with FIG. 5.

At block 404, the server-side TMD detects a criterion upon which toreplace the first server device as an endpoint in an end-to-endconnection associated with the end-to-end encrypted session. In oneembodiment this detection criteria may include detecting a type of datarequested by the client device. Additionally or alternatively thecriteria may include a periodic schedule, a system upgrade of the serverdevice, a request by an administrator, or the like.

At block 406, the server-side TMD replaces the first server device witha second server device as an endpoint in the encrypted connection. Inone embodiment, the server-side TMD utilizes a renegotiation of theencrypted connection to establish the second server device as anendpoint. The replacement of the server device with the second serverdevice is described in more detail below in conjunction with FIG. 6.

At block 408, the server-side TMD may read, intercept, delay, augment,delete, prune, compress, enhance, accelerate, transpose, or otherwisemodify data sent over the encrypted connection. In one embodiment, theserver-side TMD may work in conjunction with a client-side TMD tofurther enhance data transmitted over the encrypted connection. Theenhancement of data transmitted over the encrypted connection isdescribed in more detail below in conjunction with FIG. 7. The processthen terminates at a return block.

FIG. 5 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing oneembodiment of a process for generating a session key associated with anend-to-end encrypted session. In one embodiment, process 500 may beimplemented by server-side TMD 110.

Process 500 begins, after a start block, at block 502, by receiving aprivate key associated with the first server device. In one embodiment,the first server device may comprise one of server devices 112-115illustrated in FIG. 1. In one embodiment, the private key of the firstserver device may be provided by a system administrator. Additionally oralternatively, the private key may be provided by a local domaincontroller, LDAP server, or the second network device itself.

At block 504, a first set of handshake messages associated with anencrypted session are intercepted. In one embodiment, the creation ofthe encrypted session may be initiated by a client device, such as oneof client devices 102-104. In one embodiment, the first set of handshakemessages includes a “CLIENT HELLO” message sent by the client devicetoward a first server device. After being intercepted and stored, the“CLIENT HELLO” message may be forwarded on to the first server. In oneembodiment, by storing the intercepted handshake messages such as the“CLIENT HELLO” message, the server-side TMD is enabled to perform theactions described herein at any time throughout the lifetime of thecorresponding encrypted session.

In response to the “CLIENT HELLO”, the first server device may send a“SERVER HELLO” message, a “SERVER CERTIFICATE” message enabling theclient device to identify the first server device, a “SERVER KEYEXCHANGE” message including the first server device's public key, a“CERTIFICATE REQUEST” message requesting that the client send itscertificate enabling the server device to identify the client device,and a “SERVER HELLO DONE” message, all of which may be intercepted andstored in a first set of handshake messages, and forwarded on to theclient device.

In response to the “SERVER HELLO DONE” message, the client device may inone embodiment transmit a “CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE” message, including arandom number (e.g. a nonce) generated by the client device andencrypted with the first server device's public key. In one embodiment,the “CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE” message may be intercepted, stored in thefirst set of handshake messages, and forwarded on to the first serverdevice. Additionally or alternatively, the first set of handshakemessages may include any additional messages exchanged between theclient device and the first server device while establishing theencrypted session, for example a “CERTIFICATE” message containing theclient device's certificate enabling the server device to identify theclient device. In one embodiment, upon completion of this exchange ofhandshake messages, the client device and the first server device haveestablished an end-to-end encrypted session.

Processing next continues to block 506, where secret data is extractedfrom the intercepted first set of handshake messages. In one embodiment,the received private key of the first server device may be used toextract secret data by decrypt the payload of the “CLIENT KEY EXCHANGE”,including a random number generated by the client device and encryptedwith the public key of the first server device. Additionally oralternatively, the server-side TMD extracts the “pre-master secret.”

Processing next continues to block 508, where in one embodiment, thedecrypted random number is used in combination with one or more otherrandom numbers exchanged between the client device and the first serverdevice to generate a session key. In one embodiment, the session key maybe a “master secret”. In one embodiment, the session key is combinedwith one or more other random numbers exchanged during the encryptedsession handshake to generate connection keys. The connection keys maybe used to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted over the encryptedconnection.

In one embodiment, the client device and the first server device alsoindependently calculate the session key based on the exchanged handshakemessages. In one embodiment, the client device and the first serverdevice also independently calculate the connection keys. In someembodiments, the server-side TMD may calculate the session key based oninformation in the intercepted handshake messages. Alternatively,instead of independently calculating the session key, the server-sideTMD may receive the session key and/or connection key(s) from one of thefirst server, the client, another network device, or a systemadministrator.

Regardless of how the connection keys are generated or obtained, theconnection keys enable encrypted data transmitted between the clientdevice and the first server device to be decrypted. In one embodiment,the server-side TMD may decrypt the data using the connection keys, andthen may augment, delete, enhance, or otherwise modify the decrypteddata. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD may re-encrypt the modifieddata using the connection keys, and transmit the modified data to theother of the client device and the first server device. The process thenterminates at a return block.

FIG. 6 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing oneembodiment of a process for replacing an endpoint in an end-to-endencrypted connection with a second server device. In one embodiment,process 600 may be implemented by server-side TMD 110.

Process 600 begins, after a start block, at block 602, where in oneembodiment server-side TMD transmits a renegotiation request to theclient device over the end-to-end encrypted connection. In oneembodiment, the server-side TMD transmits the renegotiation requestmessage in response to extracting an HTTP header sent by either theclient device or the first server device, and determining the HTTPheader includes a request for content located on the second serverdevice. Server-side TMD 110 may direct a request for a resource to aparticular server device based on network traffic, network topology,capacity of a server device, content requested, and a host of othertraffic distribution mechanisms. Also, server-side TMD 110 may recognizepackets that are part of the same communication, flow, and/or stream andmay perform special processing on such packets, such as directing themto the same server device.

In one embodiment, the server-side TMD requests or otherwise initiatesrenegotiation by originating and transmitting an “SSL HELLO REQUEST” tothe client device over the end-to-end encrypted connection. In oneembodiment, the server-side TMD utilizes encrypted connectionrenegotiation to replace the first server device with one or more secondserver devices as an endpoint of the end-to-end encrypted connection. Asdiscussed above, the client (or server) device may in one embodiment notknow that a different server (or client) device has become the endpoint.In this way, the function of the server-side TMD may be transparent tothe client (or server) device.

Processing next continues to block 604, where the server-side TMDintercepts a second set of handshake messages sent in response to the“SSL HELLO REQUEST”. In one embodiment, the second set of handshakemessages are encrypted using connection key and transmitted by theclient device over the end-to-end encrypted connection. In oneembodiment the second set of handshake messages are addressed to thefirst server device.

Processing next continues to block 606, where the server-side TMDdecrypts the second set of handshake message using the connection key.

Processing next continues to block 608, where the server-side TMDredirects the decrypted second set of handshake messages to the secondserver device, thereby enabling the second server device to become anendpoint in the end-to-end encrypted connection. In one embodiment, bydirecting the second set of handshake messages to the second serverdevice, the requests made by the client device over the end-to-endencrypted connection may be re-distributed by the server-side TMD tomore than one server device. In one embodiment, the existing connectionthat had been established between the server-side TMD and the firstserver device is gracefully terminated by the server-side TMD.Alternatively, the existing connection between the server-side TMD andthe first server device may be cached, pooled, or otherwise maintainedfor future use.

Additionally or alternatively, instead of establishing the second serverdevice as an endpoint, the server-side TMD may utilize encryptedconnection renegotiation to make itself an endpoint of the encryptedconnection. In this embodiment, the server-side TMD may act as anencrypted connection accelerator: receiving encrypted content from theclient device, decrypting the received content, forwarding the decryptedcontent to a server device for processing, and encrypting the serverdevice's response. In such instances, the TMD may communicate with thefirst server device in the clear or establish another connection withthe first server device. In another embodiment, the server-side TMD maygenerate encrypted content itself, rather than forwarding content fromanother server, such as a cached data or generated data. In anotherembodiment, a client-side TMD may similarly utilize encrypted connectionrenegotiation to make itself an endpoint of the encrypted connection,act as an encrypted connection accelerator, generate content such ascached data, and the like. Additionally or alternatively, theserver-side TMD may ignore the ensuing renegotiation between the clientdevice and the first server device, such that the server-side TMD ceasesto decrypt and modify content sent over the end-to-end encryptedconnection. Instead, the server-side TMD may route data sent over therenegotiated encrypted connection to the first server device as it wouldany other network connection. Similarly, in an other embodiment, aclient-side TMD may also utilize encrypted connection renegotiation toignore an ensuing renegotiation, “stepping out” of the encryptedconnection.

Additionally or alternatively, the server-side TMD may terminate anencrypted connection to a client device and another encrypted connectionto a server device. The server-side TMD may convert this pair ofencrypted connections into a single end-to-end encrypted connectionbetween the client device and the server device. In one embodiment, theserver-side TMD may perform such a conversion by utilizing encryptedconnection renegotiation and handshake message forwarding between theclient device and the server device. In such an embodiment, the TMD maythen perform any of the operations described herein on data transmittedover the end-to-end encrypted connection.

Processing next continues to block 610, where the private key of thesecond server device is received by the server-side TMD. Additionally oralternatively, the server-side TMD may receive the private key of thesecond server device before transmitting the renegotiation request. Inone embodiment, the server-side TMD receives the private key of thesecond server device in any of the manners discussed above with regardto receiving the private key of the first server device.

Processing next continues to block 612, where the private key of thesecond server device is used to extract secret data from the second setof handshake messages. In one embodiment, the server-side TMD extractssecret data from the second set of handshake messages in a mannersimilar to the extraction of secret data from the first set of handshakemessages, as discussed above with respect to block 506.

Processing next continues to block 614, where the server-side TMDgenerates a second session key based at least on the secret dataextracted from the second set of handshake messages. In one embodiment,the second session key is generated in a manner similar to thegeneration of the first session key, as discussed above with respect toblock 508. In one embodiment, the generated second session key isutilized to create a second set of connection keys, defining anend-to-end encrypted connection between the client device and the secondserver device.

Processing next continues to block 616, where a message sent over theend-to-end encrypted connection of the re-negotiated end-to-endencrypted session is intercepted and processed by the server-side TMD.In one embodiment, the intercepted message is transmitted by the clientdevice and is addressed to the first server device, as the client devicemay be unaware that the second network device is now the other endpointof the renegotiated end-to-end encrypted session. Additionally oralternatively, the second server device may transmit a message that isintercepted and processed by server-side TMD. In either case,server-side TMD may perform additional processing, optionally inconjunction with a client-side TMD and/or third party content provider118, to augment, delete, prune, enhance, delay, accelerate, or otherwisemodify the intercepted message. For example, an advertisement or othercontent may be provided by third party content provider 118, that maythen be embedded in data transmitted between the second server deviceand the client device.

Processing next continues to block 618, where in the embodiment in whichthe server-side TMD intercepts a message transmitted by the clientdevice and addressed to the first server device, the server-side TMDredirects the intercepted message to the second server device. Theprocess then terminates at a return block

In one embodiment, the process illustrated in FIG. 6 enables an existingend-to-end encrypted connection to be handed off to a new server device,while from the perspective of the client device, the identity of theserver is unchanged. In one embodiment, renegotiation happens within theexisting encrypted session tunnel.

FIG. 7 illustrates a logical flow diagram generally showing oneembodiment of a process for enhancing data transmitted between aclient-side TMD and a server-side TMD over the encrypted connection. Inone embodiment, process 700 may be implemented by server-side TMD 110.

Process 700 begins, after a start block, at block 702, where theserver-side TMD 110 transmits the second set of connection keys to aclient-side TMD 106. In one embodiment, the second set of connectionkeys may be transmitted over the end-to-end encrypted session.Alternatively, the second set of connection keys may be transmitted overa separate encrypted session/connection, such as secure tunnel (B).

Processing next continues to block 704, where the client-side TMD 106,in one embodiment, intercepts encrypted data sent from the client deviceover the end-to-end encrypted connection. In one embodiment, typicallywhen the client device is unaware that the second server device is nowthe endpoint of the end-to-end encrypted connection, the encrypted datasent by the client device may be addressed to the first server device.Additionally or alternatively, when the client device is aware that thesecond server device 701 is now the endpoint of the end-to-end encryptedconnection, the encrypted data sent by the client device may beaddressed to the second server device 701.

Processing next continues to block 706, where the client-side TMD 106,in one embodiment, decrypts the intercepted data using the receivedsecond set of connection keys.

Processing next continues to block 708, where the client-side TMD 106,in one embodiment, processes the decrypted data. In one embodiment, thedecrypted data may be augmented, deleted, compressed, accelerated, orotherwise modified.

Processing next continues to block 710, where the client-side TMD 106,in one embodiment, re-encrypts the processed data using the second setof connection keys, and transmits the re-encrypted processed datatowards the second server device 701. In this embodiment, processingcontinues at block 712.

Additionally or alternatively, the client-side TMD 106 may explicitly beworking in conjunction with server-side TMD 110 to transmit data betweenthe client device and the second server device 701. In this case, theclient-side TMD 106 may transmit the processed data to the server-sideTMD 110 using a separate tunnel, such as secure tunnel (B) throughnetwork 108. In this embodiment, the secure tunnel (B) may utilize anencrypted connection separate and apart from the end-to-end encryptedconnection. In other words, client-side TMD 106 may communicate withserver-side TMD 110 using a separate set of connection keys to encryptthe processed data, or another type of encryption entirely. Uponreceiving the data transmitted through secure tunnel (B), theserver-side TMD 110 typically decrypts and performs further processingon the decrypted data. For example, if the client-side TMD 106compressed the processed data to reduce transmission time, theserver-side TMD 110 typically will decompress the data, and optionallyperform additional processing as discussed throughout this disclosure.Then, processing continues at block 714.

In one embodiment, the client-side TMD 106 and the server-side TMD 110may utilize two levels of encryption—the encryption used for theend-to-end encrypted connection established between the client deviceand the second server device 701, and additionally the encryption usedby secure tunnel (B). This embodiment provides two layers of securityfor data transmitted over public networks, such as the internet,enhancing security of the transmitted data.

Processing next continues to block 712, where the server-side TMD 110intercepts the processed data sent by the client-side TMD 106. In oneembodiment, the server-side TMD 110 decrypts the intercepted data usingthe second set of connection keys.

In one embodiment, server-side TMD 110 performs further processing onthe intercepted and decrypted data. In one embodiment, server-side TMD110 augments, deletes, decompresses, or otherwise modifies theintercepted and decrypted data.

Processing next continues to block 714, where the server-side TMD 110encrypts the further processed data using the second set of connectionkeys, and transmits the re-encrypted data to the second server device701. In one embodiment, regardless of whether data was intercepted,decrypted, modified, re-encrypted, forwarded, or the like, theend-to-end encrypted connection (e.g. a connection contained in securesession (A) as shown in FIG. 1) remains intact from the perspective ofthe client device and the second server device 701.

Processing next continues to block 716, where the second server device701 receives, decrypts, and processes the data transmitted by theserver-side TMD 110. The process then terminates at a return block

FIG. 8 illustrates a signal flow diagram generally showing oneembodiment of the process of FIGS. 4-6.

Process 800 begins at 802 by the client device transmitting a “CLIENTHELLO” handshake message as discussed above with respect to block 504.Processing continues to 804, where the server-side TMD 110 interceptsand forwards handshake messages as also discussed above with respect toblock 504. Processing continues to 806, where the first server receivesthe “CLIENT HELLO” handshake message, among others, as discussed abovewith respect to block 504.

Processing continues to 808 and 812, where other handshake messages areexchanged between the client device and the first server device, asdiscussed above with respect to block 504.

Processing continues to 810, where secret data, such as a random numbergenerated by the client device and encrypted by the client device withthe public key of the first server device, is extracted from the otherhandshake messages by the server-side TMD 110 using the private key ofthe first server device, as discussed above with respect to block 508.

Processing optionally continues to 813, where secret data, such as thesecret data generated in 810, is received by client-side TMD 106. In oneembodiment, this secret data may be used to generate a connection key.Additionally or alternatively, a connection key may be received byclient-side TMD 106. In one embodiment, either the secret data or theconnection key may be transmitted to client-side TMD 106 by server-sideTMD 110. Once client-side TMD 106 has received or generated theconnection key, client-side TMD 106 is enabled to intercept and enhanceencrypted data as it is transmitted over the connection.

Processing continues to 814, where a renegotiation request istransmitted by the server-side TMD 110 to the client device, asdiscussed above with respect to block 602.

Processing continues to 816 and 820, where in response to receiving therenegotiation request, the client device begins to exchange a second setof handshake messages, as discussed above with respect to block 412.

Processing continues to 618, where the server-side TMD 110 intercepts,decrypts, and redirects the second set of handshake messages towards thesecond server, as discussed above with respect to blocks 604 and 606.

Processing continues to 822, where the server-side TMD 110 transmits thesecond set of connection keys to the client-side TMD 106, as discussedabove with regard to FIG. 7.

Processing continues to 824 and 826, where the end-to-end connectioninitially established between the client device and the first serverdevice has been altered as a result of the requested renegotiation,resulting in the encrypted connection being re-established between theclient device and the second server device.

Illustrative Operating Environment for Routing Based on Border GatewayProtocol (BGP) Broadcasting

FIG. 9 shows components of an illustrative environment 900 in which theBorder Gateway Protocol (BGP) may be utilized to direct traffic fromclient devices 902, 904, and 906 through client-side traffic managementdevice 910. In one embodiment, client devices 902, 904, and 906 aregeographically located in a remote region 901, where the client devices902, 904, and 906 typically are not connected to the Internet through aclient-side TMD. As a result, client devices 902, 904, and 906 willtypically transmit data through routers 912, 914, and 916 respectively,communicating directly with the head office 903 through network 920.This connection is illustrated as a dotted line between router 912 andnetwork 920.

However, it is often desirable to direct traffic from one or all ofclient devices 902, 904, and 906 through a single client-side trafficmanagement device, such as client-side TMD 910. For instance, it may notbe cost efficient to provision a client-side TMD for every branch officein the remote region 901, but it would be cost efficient to provision asingle client-side TMD for some or all branch offices in the remoteregion 901. In some embodiments, client-side TMD 910 may be considered aremote TMD as depicted in FIG. 9, as it may be remote from head office903.

In one embodiment, client-side TMD 910 may be configured to broadcast amessage using the BGP protocol. In one embodiment, the client-side TMD910 may broadcast a BGP protocol message indicating that it knows thebest route to the head office 903. As such, after this BGP messagepropagates to routers 912, 914, and 916, these routers will routerequests by client devices 902, 904, and 906 through network 908 toclient-side TMD 910. Once received by the client-side TMD 910,communication between the client devices and the server devices may beoptimized as discussed above with respect to FIG. 7.

It will be understood that figures, and combinations of steps in theflowchart-like illustrations, can be implemented by computer programinstructions. These program instructions may be provided to a processorto produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute on theprocessor, create means for implementing the actions specified in theflowchart block or blocks. The computer program instructions may beexecuted by a processor to cause a series of operational steps to beperformed by the processor to produce a computer implemented processsuch that the instructions, which execute on the processor to providesteps for implementing the actions specified in the flowchart block orblocks. These program instructions may be stored on a computer readablemedium or machine readable medium, such as a computer readable storagemedium.

Accordingly, the illustrations support combinations of means forperforming the specified actions, combinations of steps for performingthe specified actions and program instruction means for performing thespecified actions. It will also be understood that each block of theflowchart illustration, and combinations of blocks in the flowchartillustration, can be implemented by modules such as special purposehardware-based systems which perform the specified actions or steps, orcombinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.

The above specification, examples, and data provide a completedescription of the manufacture and use of the composition of thedescribed embodiments. Since many embodiments can be made withoutdeparting from the spirit and scope of this description, the embodimentsreside in the claims hereinafter appended.

What is claimed as new and desired to be protected by Letters Patent ofthe United States is:
 1. A traffic management device interposed betweena client device and a plurality of server devices, comprising: atransceiver to send and receive data over a network; and a processorthat is operative to perform actions comprising: obtaining a session keyassociated with an end-to-end encrypted session that is establishedbetween the client device and a first server device in the plurality ofserver devices; transmitting a renegotiation request to the clientdevice over an end-to-end encrypted connection of the end-to-endencrypted session to request renegotiation of the end-to-end encryptedconnection; intercepting a second set of handshake messages sent by theclient device over the end-to-end encrypted connection, wherein thesecond set of handshake messages are addressed to the first serverdevice, and wherein the second set of handshake messages are sent inresponse to the renegotiation request; decrypting the intercepted secondset of handshake messages using one or more connection keys generatedbased on the session key; and redirecting the decrypted second set ofhandshake messages to a selected second server device of the pluralityof server devices, such that the selected second server device replacesthe first server device as an endpoint in the end-to-end encryptedconnection.